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Investigating the Causes of 
Center/Periphery Conflict in the Russian 
Federation 
 
Brett A. Strand 
 
What are the real causes of conflict between the federal regions and central authority in the 
Russian Federation? Why is it that some regions are compelled to act assertively towards Moscow, while 
others are not? These questions are relevant for any actor concerned with Russian affairs; moreover, they 
represent a critical debate for those who hope to bring aid to Russia’s struggling regional populations.  
This research furthers the debate through a test of the two major schools of ethno-federal thought: 
primordialism and bargaining theory.  The study (1) identifies relevant variables, (2) constructs indices to 
represent each of the theories, and (3) tests those indices for correlation with regional aggression.  This 
research shows that characteristics suggested by both primordialism and bargaining theory exert influence 
on regional aggression; however, it also finds that bargaining theory more accurately explains the 
behavior of Russian regions.  In the end, this study concludes that ethnic differences, per se, do not lead to 
center/periphery conflict in the Russian Federation. 
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Federalism:  
The Source of Russia’s Problems? 
 
It is widely believed that the main threat to Russia’s long-term stability is the increasingly 
autocratic behavior demonstrated by its central authority.  However, any characterization of the 
Russian state as a political body experiencing unchallenged pressure from the center is a gross 
oversimplification.   Differences in status and behavior have created a patchwork of diverse 
regions, each taking a unique stance towards Moscow. Within this ambiguous power structure, 
relations between the regions and central authority have varied widely.  Several regions have felt 
justified in acting aggressively towards the center and have thereby increased their power on both 
the regional and national levels; conversely, a large number of regions have opted for more 
cordial relations with Moscow.  
Plainly stated, Russia is a highly dysfunctional federation and, as such, it should be seen 
as a group of unique (and often irrational) actors rather than as a monolithic political unit.  The 
resulting instability prevents international actors from being able to reliably judge the long-term 
potential of any individual federal unit.  Therefore, a frustrating dilemma exists for any 
organization seeking to become active in Russian affairs: while it is necessary to confirm regional 
stability before becoming active in the Russian Federation, there currently exists no reliable 
method by which to assess the behavior of its federal units. 
 This study bases itself upon the premise that any assessment of regional stability should 
begin with an analysis of center-periphery relations.  More specifically, it posits that interested 
parties ought to investigate a region’s potential for aggressive behavior. Such an investigation 
will (1) assess the likelihood that a specific region will offend Moscow and face the inevitable 
repercussions and (2) analyze the potential for such conflicts to accumulate and lead to the 
unraveling of the Russian Federation, as they did in the USSR.   
What causes certain federal regions to behave aggressively in their relations with 
Moscow, while others remain amicable and agreeable to the center’s wishes?  Why do some 
ethnically based regions feel compelled to strike out against the central authority? Why do others 
opt for more congenial relations with the center?  And do the current political dysfunctions 
threaten to cause a collapse of the Russian Federation, much like the one that consumed the 
Soviet Union?  By considering the predominate theories regarding ethno-federal relations and 
testing the viability of each school as a predictor of regional aggression, this study will attempt to 
clarify the rules by which Russian region’s behave and to which all interested parties must 
therefore adhere. 
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A Brief History of 
Ethnicity & the Russian State 
The Historical Context. For over a millennium, Russian rulers promoted the political 
strength of the state over the ethnic value of its people. In doing so, they created a nation that 
differs sharply from most other Western states.  Modern states most often organized around a 
specific ethnic identity; Russia, in contrast, gathered hundreds of different ethnic groups under a 
single authority. In order to complete this task, the Russian government repeatedly adjusted its 
policy towards minority cultures.  Moreover, leaders occasionally redefined and manipulated the 
concept of ethnicity in order to meet the goals of the state.  The long-term effects of these actions 
continue to be felt. 
For the majority of the second millennium, Russia existed as an imperial state.  As such, 
its borders expanded and contracted quite frequently; it was constantly overtaking and 
abandoning regional ethnic groups.  In order to preserve this ever-changing body, identity was 
defined as a function of the state rather than of regional culture. Ethnic groups residing within the 
borders of imperial Russia were asked—or, more often, forced— to assume a common language 
and religion as 
the state created a territorial empire spanning a huge landmass and populated by 
a diverse array of European and Asian peoples, who differed profoundly among 
themselves in religion, way of life, and relationship to Russian authority 
(Remington). 
 
In this complicated situation, the suppression of ethnicity existed alongside the manipulation of 
identity.  Hence, ethnic groups were asked to identify themselves as citizens of the Russian 
Empire and nothing more. 
In 1917, the Russian Revolution and the coming of Soviet rule led to a sea change in 
relations between ethnic groups and the state.  Whereas previous Russian governments had 
promoted a purely Russian identity over all others, the Soviet Empire was prevented from doing 
so, due to the simple fact that it was comprised of multiple national republics.  Therefore, the 
Soviet government chose to actively employ its ethnic diversity as a tool for controlling its 
citizenry. During the 20th century, entire communities were invented for political purposes, 
cultural groups were granted superficial autonomy, and ethnicities were erased from the record 
books (See Figure 1.1).  In the most tragic cases, attempts were made to exterminate entire 
populations, as with the Ukrainians during the Holodomor28.  Thereby, the Soviet period both 
                                                 
28
 A deliberate, Soviet-created famine that nearly wiped out the USSR’s Ukrainian population in 1932 and 1933.  
126   Res Publica 
 
 
inflamed and confused ethnic identity.  In addition, it caused inhabitants of the Russian region to 
view central authority as 
an outside force, to which 
they were always 
beholden but never loyal. 
As the Russian 
Communist state 
collapsed at the end of the 
20th century, ethnic 
identity once again 
emerged as an urgent 
issue.  For most ethnic 
groups, the past 
millennium had been an 
elongated cultural trial.  The process of constant ethnic manipulation had created an environment 
in which self-identity was confusing at best and dangerous at worst. Post-Soviet leaders were 
charged with the difficult task of assessing this confusing situation and utilizing it as a means of 
organization.  In the end, leaders designed a federal 
state consisting of 88 units, each belonging to one of 
several categories of autonomy and composition (see 
Table 1.1).  Of the 88 federal units, 31 exist as ethnic 
regions with a specific titular nationality29. 
History’s Continuing Relevance. In the 
decade and a half since its creation, the world has 
witnessed the maturation of the Federation as regions 
have worked alongside Moscow in developing the 
larger Russian sphere.  The regions have diverged in 
identity and behavior, leading to the conclusion that 
modern Russia is first and foremost a federation.  
This federal structure has had two concrete effects on the nature of the Russian state. 
First, the Russian Federation is home to a large collection of independent political bodies. 
For members of the business and political spheres, this means that one cannot merely consider a 
commitment to Russia but to Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Komi or Chechnya as well.  A clear example 
                                                 
29
 A political map representing Russia’s federal structure can be found in Appendix A. 
Categories of Federal Units 
(From most to least autonomous) 
Type Ethnically Based? Number 
Republic Yes 21 
Oblast No 48 
Krai No 7 
Autonomous Oblast Yes 1 
Autonomous Okrug Yes 9 
Federal City No 2 
 
Table 1.1 
The Historic Experience of 
Russian Minorities 
1929-1989
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Ad
yg
ea
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Al
tai
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ba
shk
or
tos
tan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bu
rya
tia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ch
ec
hn
ya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ch
uv
as
hia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Da
ges
tan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ing
us
het
ia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ka
bar
din
o-
Ba
lka
ria
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ka
lm
yk
ia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ka
ra
cha
y-C
her
ke
ss
ia  
 
 
 
Ka
re
lia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kh
aka
ss
ia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ko
m
i   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ma
ri E
l   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mo
rdo
via
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No
rth
 
Os
se
tia
-
Al
an
ia 
 
 
 
Sa
kh
a-
Ya
ku
tia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ta
tar
sta
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tu
va
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ud
m
ur
tia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ne
t C
ha
n
ge
 
in
 
Po
pu
la
tio
n
 
(+/
-
) 
( A
s 
a
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f R
eg
io
n
a
l P
o
pu
la
tio
n
)
Figure 1.1 
Source: Environmental & Health 
Atlas of Russia 
Res Publica    127 
 
 
 
 
of the unique political situations found throughout Russia is the region of Kalmykia. Since its first 
national elections in 1993, the region has been under the rule of President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov.  
Mr. Ilyumzhinov has compiled a list of actions that range from the irresponsible to the bizarre: he 
has abolished the parliament, altered the constitution, threatened to turn the region into an 
independent tax haven, and single-handedly orchestrated the construction of Chess City (a 50-
million dollar recreation complex on the outskirts of the capital city).  President Ilyumzhinov’s 
behavior, coupled with Moscow’s inability and apparent unwillingness to interfere with his 
actions, clearly demonstrate the bizarre and troublesome nature of regional politics in Russia.   
A second and far more pressing concern, however, is the humanitarian cost that federally 
based regional conflict often extols. Statistics regarding regional conflict in Chechnya alone are 
staggering: 500,000 civilian refugees, symptoms of physical or emotional distress among 86% of 
the population, 25,000 troop deaths, and perhaps 250,000 total casualties.  Sadly, modern Russia 
plays witness to similar violent conflicts with unacceptable frequency and often manages these 
situations without international scrutiny. No explanation or rationalization is necessary to prove 
the urgency of these cases—plainly stated, men, women, and children are dying due to the 
conflict that often consumes Russia’s regions. Federal relations play a central role in fueling these 
tragic events.  Therefore, a thorough understanding of regional aggression is an urgent necessity. 
 
Russia as an  
Ethno- Federal Research Project 
The Study of Ethnic Federalism and the Russian State 
Ethno-federal studies. Previous scholarship regarding ethnic federations can be divided 
into two subtly different areas of emphasis. The first vein includes those studies that primarily 
address minorities (Saideman 1997; Wright, Jr., 1991; Brancati 2006; Hale, 2004). The second 
includes research that is more focused on federations (Coakley 1992; Ellingsen 2000).  Both of 
these schools rely heavily on the groundbreaking research of William Riker30 and have built upon 
both his and other studies in order to analyze the complex relationship between governance and 
ethnicity.   
Study of the Russian Federation. A large number of area studies have been conducted 
regarding Russia and its behavior as an ethnic federation.  Russia’s unique post-Communist 
situation has offered scholars a chance to analyze the behavior of ethnic groups, both in the 
                                                 
30
 Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, 1964. 
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current Federation (Bahry et al. 2005; Zassorin 2000) and in conjunction with its Soviet history 
(Hanson 1998; Tishkov 1999).  These studies have confirmed the more general conclusions of 
ethnic research by showing that ethnicity still matters in modern Russia. 
The emergence of the Russian Federation has also provided scholars with an opportunity 
to observe and critique the way in which a developing federal state matures and behaves (Gibson 
2001; Herd 1999; Lynn et al. 1997).  Specifically, many studies have analyzed the negotiation of 
Russia’s unique regional constitutions (Filippov et al. 1998; Stoner-Weiss 1999; Chebankova 
2005). Researchers have also documented national development in order to compare the nature of 
Russia’s federation with that of its communist predecessor (Alexseev 2001; Drobizheva 2005; 
Hale 2000).  Lastly, there exists a group of scholars who have chosen to focus their research 
squarely on Russian regions.  Their studies assess the region’s role and behavior as part of the 
larger federal unit (Treisman 1997; Dowley 1998; Bahry 2005). This collection of research 
clearly demonstrates that federal regions are independent actors for whom unique economic and 
political situations lead to diverse actions. 
Four Conclusions. Researchers have therefore established a number of clear notions 
regarding the Russian Federation.  The following conclusions can be seen as the first four pieces 
of the puzzle being confronted:   
1. Cultural identity still matters in modern Russia. 
2. Ethno-federalism often breeds ethnic conflict. 
3. Modern economic and political factors vary among Russia’s federal units. 
4. Two prominent schools of thought exist with regards to ethno-federal conflict: 
primordialism and bargaining theory. 
The fourth and final conclusion is most pertinent to this research.  Indeed, it is by testing 
these two schools against one another that this study hopes to establish a more reliable method of 
analyzing center/periphery conflict in modern Russia. 
 
Ancient Bonds: Primordialism  
Researchers and pundits often argue that ethnic conflicts stem primarily from endemic 
qualities held by distinct cultural groups.  Lists of the relevant dimensions of ethnicity typically 
include salient cultural aspects such as appearance, religion, language, custom, and history31. 
Primordial (or “essentialist”) theory relies on the notion that these cultural identifiers determine 
the nature of the relationship between actors.  It is also important to understand the role that 
                                                 
31
 “Primordial Ties”, Geertz. 
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Figure 1.2 
Titular Nationality Population 
As a Part of Regional Population
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minority or majority status plays in a region’s behavior; indeed, while all ethnicities are 
considered minorities on the national level, only some constitute majorities within their titular 
region.  Primordial theory suggests that these majority groups will behave more aggressively, 
emboldened by their apparent primacy.   
Primordialists assume a level of inexpugnability when referring to ethnicity; they often 
assert that, “congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on… have ineffable, and at times 
overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves [Emphasis added]” (Geertz, 42).  Moreover, 
they presume that this aspect of society will inevitably influence government and politics. Such 
an influence will occur when an ethnic group recognizes or believes that it is somehow different 
than the main national ethnicity.  This belief will lead them to behave in a way that attempts to 
manage the effects of their “otherness”. 
In keeping with this theory, primordialists have argued that Russia’s status as a 
multiethnic region continues to determine its political momentum in the most basic of ways 
(Bahry 2005; Coakley 1992; Drobezheva 2005; Ellingsen 2000; Gibson, 2001; Hale 2004; and 
Hughes 2002).  Primordial scholars believe that the sordid history of ethnicity in the Russian state 
manifested itself when groups began to identify themselves publicly during the perestroika 
period. This is a logical statement if one accepts primordialism’s basic tenets; indeed, “the 
argument that ‘repressed’ nationalisms inevitably reemerged the moment that Gorbachov 
removed the coercive controls formerly imposed… fits logically with a view of ethnicity as 
somehow fundamental to human social identity” (Hanson, 4).  Consequentially, scholars of the 
primordial school discount the importance of contemporary factors when considering regional 
conflict; rather, they posit that Russia’s federal system is inexorably linked to ethnicity as a 
means of organization.   
This paper does 
not argue that primordial 
theory is based upon a 
false premise; a large 
amount of reliable data 
demonstrates the 
continuing diversity of 
ethnic groups in Russia 
(see Figure 1.2).  Indeed, 
the very existence of such 
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diverse characteristics is precisely what makes this research possible. Previous studies have also 
demonstrated ethnicity’s indirect effect on elite behavior (Treisman 1997) and political culture 
(Zassorin 2000). However, this study seeks to show that ethnic characteristics, while evident, do 
not themselves lead to regional aggression.  
 
Contemporary Powers: Bargaining Theory 
 Scholars of the bargaining (or “instrumentalist”) school have argued that all political 
entities ought to be viewed as rational actors.  This leads to the basic premise of bargaining 
theory: that actors, and in this case regions, will engage in conflict only when the rewards of 
conflict outweigh the risks.  Bargaining theory argues that all parties approach the table in an 
attempt to benefit and that, furthermore, they do so only after having completed an analysis of 
their own position.  Such an analysis will, presumably, lead to their acceptance of a rational 
strategy in terms of costs and benefits. 
 According to instrumentalists, the analysis performed by regions involves a review of 
their economic and political “bargaining chips”. Useful factors include such measures as 
international economic influence, natural resource potential and geographic importance.  In cases 
in which these factors are present, leaders will likely realize that their economic might allows 
them to realistically challenge central authority.  Such regions will decide that they have enough 
bargaining chips to win a given argument; therefore, they will act confidently and aggressively 
towards the center.  A second possible outcome of such an analysis is that regions may realize the 
negligibility of their potential loss.  In this situation, governments will decide that having so few 
bargaining chips at the outset of interactions means that they have nothing to lose by offending 
central authority.  However, in either of these situations, regions behave in a rational manner after 
completing a concrete analysis. 
 Bargaining theory’s accuracy in describing Russian affairs has been corroborated in 
previous research; studies have shown that the possession of some type of bargaining advantage 
greatly affects regional behavior in Russia (Dowley 1998; Hanson 1998; Herd 1999; and Lynn et 
al. 1997).  In fact, bargaining scholars have even offered a counter-explanation for Russia’s 
“ethnic revival” by writing, “[the situation] gave the impression that here there was a return to 
tribal tradition and to tribal separatism when in fact tribalism in the contemporary situation was 
one type of political grouping within the framework of the new state” (Cohen, 83).  Data also 
show that the economic situations of the regions are exceedingly diverse and therefore lend 
themselves to an effective analysis of differentiation in bargaining power (see Figures 1.3 and 
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1.4).  By connecting bargaining theory to regional aggression, this study takes the next logical 
step in this field of research.   
 
 
 
Testing Conflict among Russian Regions: 
Methods & Models  
Selecting the Most Appropriate Cases 
 The first issue that must be confronted is case selection.  This study recognizes that, in 
order to accurately test the hypotheses, cases must be (1) autonomous, (2) ethnically based, and 
(3) similar and numerous enough to ensure reliable results. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation 
is composed of 88 highly diverse subjects; therefore, it is logistically impossible to collect the 
necessary data for all cases.  It is also apparent that many of the federal member states do not 
possess the resources or even the authority required to behave aggressively towards the center.  
Therefore, this study selects the 21 autonomous republics of the Russian Federation as its case 
set32.  These 21 cases boast a high level of autonomy, an ethnic basis, and the amount of available 
data necessary to conduct the intended research.  In addition, this study will gain the increased 
reliability that stems from investigating an entire universe of cases (all 21 autonomous regions). 
                                                 
32
 A full list of the cases can be found in Appendix B. 
Figure 1.3 
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The Research Design Model 
Operationalization of the suggested concepts will require extensive intuitive reasoning.  
In order to accurately capture the complexity of the referenced ideas, indices will be constructed 
as a proxy for each of the main independent variables (primordialism and bargaining theory) and 
the dependent variable (regional aggression).  The following research model will be utilized in 
order to test the main hypothesis, which is that bargaining theory will be more strongly 
associated with regional aggression than will primordialism and will, therefore, more accurately 
predict regional stability:  
 
 
 
Independent Variable 1 
Primordialism 
Primordial Hypotheses 
Primordial Indicators 
Primordial Index 
Bargaining Hypotheses 
Bargaining Indicators 
Bargaining Index 
Tests of 
Association 
Regional Aggression Index 
 
Dependent Variable 
Aggressive Behavior 
Independent Variable 2 
Bargaining Theory 
The Investigatory Schema:  
Primordialism versus Bargaining Theory 
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The Testing Schedule 
 This study’s use of a tiered measurement system—one that utilizes both individual 
indicators and additive indices— allows for a sequence of increasingly pertinent tests.  First, in 
the Pre-test Phase, the study will construct an accurate measure of the dependent variable. Phase 
One will include a preliminary analysis of the six individual indicators.  Lastly, in Phase Two, the 
study will use the results of the preliminary investigations to construct its main indices and test 
the main hypothesis.  Therefore, the schedule of tests is: 
 
 Pre-test Phase 
1. Operationalization and Measurement of the Dependent Variable 
 Phase One 
2. Bivariate Analysis of the Individual Indicators 
3. Eta33 (η) Analysis of the Individual Indicators 
Phase Two 
4. Construction of the Main Indices 
5. Bivariate Analysis of the Indices 
6. Linear Regression Analysis of the Indices 
 
Pre- Test Phase:  
Measuring Aggressive Behavior 
 
 Operationalizing Regional Aggression. The operationalization and measurement of 
aggression poses two puzzles. The first is, of course, which indicators will provide an accurate 
measure of regional aggression; for instance, this study must ensure that it is measuring 
aggressive behavior towards the center and not from it.  The second puzzle is how best to choose 
these variables so that all forms of aggression are accurately accounted for. 
 This study confronts the first puzzle by reviewing past research that utilizes federal and 
regional aggression as a variable. A review of the existing literature suggests five reliable means 
of operationalization:           
 Timing of region’s declaration of sovereignty34 (SOVER). This indicator measures the 
political aggression shown by the region during the transitory phase of the development of the 
Russian state, using rankings created by Triesman*. 
                                                 
33
  Eta is a test of association commonly used when the dependent variable is interval in nature and the independent 
variable is categorical.  η2 can be used as a proxy for r2.  
34
 Explanations of this and all other data manipulations can be found in Appendix C. 
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 Index of Constitutional Aggression (CONST). This indicator represents a measure of the 
amount of aggression encapsulated in the bilateral constitution negotiated by the region and the 
federal authority. It is constructed through a content analysis, which includes a review of a study 
that was completed by Stoner-Weiss in 1999. 
 Instances of Protest, War and Rebellion (WAR). This value is utilized to take account of 
any instances of actual physical violence that have occurred in the regions and uses data collected 
by the Minorities At Risk project since 1991. 
 Aggression in Elite Activity (ELITE). In order to measure the level of aggression shown 
by regional elites towards Moscow, this study will rely upon the extensive content analysis 
completed by Dowley*, who then translated her findings into the scale that is directly borrowed.  
 Instances of Assertion of Legal and Resource Rights (LEG.ASN/RES.ASN). Again using 
data collected by Daniel Triesman for his 1997 study, a dummy variable is created for each type of 
assertion, with a score of 0 denoting no assertion and 1 indicating at least one instance of assertion. 
 
 A second puzzle that requires close attention is how this research can best measure each 
of the preceding indicators in appropriate proportion. For example, when considering a region’s 
overall aggressive activity, an instance of armed aggression towards federal authority should 
clearly carry greater weight than an assertion of resource rights.  This study therefore utilizes an 
index that includes each indicator along with an assigned weight, which is represented as a 
cofactor.  The Aggregate Center/Periphery Aggression Index (ACPAI) is  
 
(5*WAR) + (4*ELITE) + (3*CONST) + (3*SOVER) + (1*LEG.ASN) + (1*RES.ASN). 
  
 The ACPIA Described. 
The resulting scores of the 
Aggregate Center/Periphery 
Aggression Index35 comprise an 
evenly spread spectrum that 
ranges 13.32 to 67.32 (see 
Figure 1.5).  Therefore, the 
values provide strong support 
for the notion that behavior 
towards the center varies among 
the Russian regions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
*
 For specific figures and scales, see Appendix D. 
35
 The Center/Periphery Aggression Index possesses a mean of 30.94, a standard deviation of 12.16, and a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.555 (Cronbach’s alpha, which is measured on a 0 to 1 scale, indicates the extent to which a set of items can 
be treated as measuring a single latent variable).  
Figure 1.5 
Aggregate Center/Periphery Aggression Index 
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Phase One: 
Assessing the Individual  
Hypotheses and Indicators 
 
Operationalizing the Primordial School 
The study derives the following set of auxiliary hypotheses from primordial theory: 
 
H1.1 = Titular nationalities that have been historically autonomous will show 
more aggression in regional relations with the center. 
H1.2 = Those titular nationalities that do not share the Russian Orthodox 
religion will be more likely to show aggression in center-periphery relations. 
H1.3 = Those titular nationalities that reside in a region in which they constitute 
a majority will show more aggression in relations with the center. 
 
 Each of these hypotheses captures an essential aspect of the theory that has been outlined 
in previous primordial literature. The first hypothesis assesses a key aspect of the historical 
experience of each ethnicity; the second takes account of ethnic religion (which, it is believed, 
corresponds closely with other cultural identifiers); and the third measures each ethnicity’s 
demographic status in their region and, thereby, the potential impact of their activity as an ethnic 
group.   
 Indicators that correspond with each primordial hypothesis are then identified. The choice 
of such a system requires that each indicator move in the same direction; that is, a higher score 
has to indicate a higher degree of primordial differentiation from the center.  It is also worth 
noting that primordial theory, due to its strictly ethnic nature, cannot be accurately tested through 
an assessment of the actual regions.  Therefore, this study’s ‘primordial’ variables indirectly 
measure the Russian regions by measuring each region’s titular nationality.  The following 
indicators are selected for their intuitive connection to the hypotheses and their frequent inclusion 
in the literature: 
 Majority or Minority Status (MIN.MAJ). This indicator is a dummy variable that denotes 
whether or not the titular nationality for which the region was created exists as a regional majority 
or a minority.  Those ethnicities with majority status receive a score of 0 and those with minority 
status receive a score of 1.  This classification is based upon data collected from the Statesman’s 
Yearbook. 
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 Religious Status (REL). Data is collected regarding the faith to which each region’s titular 
nationality generally ascribes.  This information is found using the Minorities at Risk data set and is 
given as a dummy variable, with 0 signifying adherence to the Russian Orthodox faith and a score 
of 1 denoting ascription to any other religion. 
 Historical Autonomy (AUT). In order to gauge the historical perspective of each titular 
nationality, each region is assigned a dummy variable that signifies its historical status as an 
autonomous state.  Research is performed on each region’s titular nationality and, subsequently, 
each region is assigned a score of either 0 or 1, with 1 signifying that an ethnicity enjoyed 
autonomy within an independent state at any point in history. 
  
Measuring Bargaining Theory 
 The auxiliary hypotheses that this study derives from bargaining theory are: 
 
H2.1 = Regions with central capitals that have a larger population and a more 
urbanized society will be more aggressive in center-periphery relations. 
H2.2 = Regions that contain oil production or transport facilities will be more 
aggressive in center-periphery relations. 
H2.3 = Regions whose economies are more engaged as foreign and domestic 
traders will show more aggression in their relations with central authority. 
 
 Each of these statements corresponds with an essential component of regional bargaining 
position.  The first measures the development of each region, by the assumption that large urban 
centers suggest internal growth; the second hypothesis takes account of oil production and 
transportation, which plays a critical role in the larger Russian economy; and the third assesses 
each regions status in the domestic and international economy.  The following indicators are 
utilized to measure the suggested concepts: 
 Population of the Regional Capital (CAP.POP).  As a measure of the region’s 
urbanization and development, the population of each capital city is found.  These figures are then 
used to construct a 5-point scale, with higher values representing a larger size. 
 Economic Interaction (ECON.INT).  In order to assess each region as an economic actor, 
data provided by the Bank of Russia is utilized. This study gathers the figures for each region in 
four categories: A) federal rubles borrowed by private enterprises, B) federal rubles borrowed by 
public enterprises, C) total foreign sales per month and D) total foreign purchases per month.  
 Oil Resources (OIL). Information regarding the location of key oil production sites and 
various oil transportation structures is collected from the Environmental Information Agency.  
Regions are then assigned a score of 0 if no oil production or transportation takes place within the 
region, 1 if the region is home to some form of oil transportation structure, and 2 if the region 
contains oil production sites. 
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Tests of the Six Indicators  
The first procedure, a test of 
bivariate correlation, measures 
association between the dependent 
variable and each of the six 
individual indicators. The results, 
which can be found in Table 1.2, are 
most useful when grouped 
according to the theory from which 
they are derived.  This division into 
primordial and bargaining indictors 
will later allow for the construction 
of the main indices.  
When considering the primordial variables, it is clear that the most strongly correlated 
indicator is an ethnic group’s majority or minority status.  Indeed, none of the other primordial 
variables show a significant correlation with regional aggression.  Therefore, the possession of a 
non-majority language or religion does not appear to have a significant influence on the amount 
of aggression with which a region behaves.  In sum, the strongest primordial determinant of 
regional aggression is whether or not the titular nationality resides in a region in which its 
members constitute a majority.   
 The results of bivariate tests involving the bargaining indicators offer further 
opportunities for analysis.  It is clear, though not surprising, that regional aggression is most 
strongly correlated with economic interaction and the volume of the capital population.  Since 
these indicators take direct account of a region’s economic development, the findings agree with 
the main hypothesis.  It is equally noteworthy, however, that there appears to be a surprisingly 
weak relationship between regional aggression and involvement in the oil industry.   
 The study next conducts an auxiliary test of the indicators using an eta measurement.  In 
this research, the eta tests are performed in order to simply reinforce the results of the bivariate 
analysis.  All eta values mirror the findings of the primary tests; thus, the scores appear to 
increase the validity of previous results36.  
 
 
                                                 
36
 Results of the eta test can be found in Appendix E. 
Bivariate Correlations 
 Pearson’s R Sig. 
Primordial Indicators   
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic 
Minority or Majority .469* .016 
Titular Nationality’s Sharing of the 
Russian Orthodox Faith .289 .102 
Historical Autonomous Status .334 .069 
Bargaining Indicators 
  
Population of Capital City .470* .016 
Presence of Oil or oil Pipeline .319 .080 
Economic Interaction .454* .019 
* -- Significance at the .05 level 
 
Table 1.2 
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Analysis of Phase One 
 It should first be noted that all relationships move in the directions predicted by the 
hypotheses, and that three of the six hypotheses receive significant support from the results (see 
Table 1.3). 
 Second, majority status appears to be the only primordial variable that correlates with 
regional aggression at a significant level.  This is interesting in that majority status is also the 
primordial indicator that most readily fits with the arguments presented by bargaining theory.  
Indeed, this study argues only that majority or minority status does not independently lead to 
conflict; it remains quite possible that population demographics exert a strong influence and make 
the mobilization of ethnicity a more realistic option by reducing the costs and increasing the 
benefits of conflict. 
 Third, the weak correlation shown between oil production and regional aggression 
requires attention.  This finding poses a dilemma for those who would argue that oil is a frequent 
cause of conflict between the center and periphery.  Of course, the results could be due to the fact 
that the possession of oil leads to interference from central authority to which regions are unable 
to respond. It must be remembered that this study only measures regional aggression towards the 
center; therefore, it could not account for such conflict even if it did exist.  Whether or not this is 
the case, it is worth noting that regions that are active in the production and transport of oil are no 
more likely to act aggressively towards central authority than those that are not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of Auxiliary Hypotheses  
 Hn Indicator 
Correct 
Direction? Significant?* 
H1.1 Majority Status Yes Yes  
H1.2 Religion Yes No 
Pr
im
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l 
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H1.3 Historical Autonomy Yes No 
H2.1 Capital Population Yes Yes 
H2.2 Oil Production Yes No 
Ba
rg
a
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g 
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H2.3 Economic Interaction Yes Yes 
* At the .05 level 
Table 1.3 
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Pearson's R Sig.
Indices
Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index .524** .004
Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index .486* .016
*-- Significance at the .05 level
**-- Significance at the .001 level
Bivariate Correlations
Table 1.4 
Phase Two: 
Testing the Rival Schools 
 
Constructing the Indices 
 Primordialism.  The Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index37 (APII) is constructed in 
accordance with the following two lessons, which were taken from the preliminary tests: (1) 
status as an ethnic minority or majority appears to be the most influential and, therefore, the most 
important of the three indicators and (2) while both religion and historical autonomy have weak 
correlations with aggression, religion’s correspondence with other cultural identifiers (language, 
culture, custom) require that it be more heavily considered. When scaled in accordance with these 
lessons and combined into a single index, the measures accurately portray the identity of each 
titular nationality. The APII can be represented as 
 
(6 * REL) + (6 *MIN.MAJ) + (3 * AUT) 
 
 Bargaining Theory.  The Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index38 (ABII) is constructed 
based upon the following observations:  (1) oil does not have a very strong influence on the 
bargaining position of each region and (2) both the population of the capital city and the level of 
economic interaction have significant and strong correlation with regional aggression.  In order to 
account for the apparent variance in influence among these indicators, this study chooses to 
structure the ABII in the following manner: 
 
(3 * CAP.POP) + (3 * ECON.INT) + (OIL) 
 
Testing the Indices  
Bivariate Tests.  The initial test of the indices utilizes simple bivariate correlation (see 
Table 1.4). The results show that 
both of the indices possess a 
significantly strong level of 
association with the dependent 
variable.  Moreover, the findings 
support this research’s main 
                                                 
37
 The APII shows a mean of 7.429, a standard deviation of 5.8187, and a Cronbach’s alpha of .580. 
38
 The ABII possesses a mean of 18.167, a standard deviation of 7.1438, and a Cronbach’s alpha of .652 
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hypothesis: when operationalized, bargaining theory is more strongly associated with regional 
aggression than is primordial theory, though by a relatively small margin.   
 Linear Regression Analysis.  The study next conducts a more rigorous, head-to-head test 
of the indices using the linear regression method. This procedure allows for a comparison of each 
index’s influence when controlling for its counterargument; therefore, if consistent with the 
results of previous tests, these findings will greatly increase this study’s confidence in its 
findings.  The results of the OLS test are presented in Table 1.5.   
 An initial consideration is that a single model that includes both independent variables 
accounts for roughly half of the variance in the dependent variable (R2= .503); this association is 
also highly significant (nearly at the .001 level).  These findings support the assumption that 
primordial and bargaining indicators each play a large role in determining regional aggression.   
 The most valuable results of any linear regression test are the beta weights.  Through 
these values, the OLS procedure allows for a direct comparison of each index’s effect when 
controlling for its rival theory; therefore, the results are critical to this study. One of the strengths 
of beta weights as a tool of measurement is that these values do not require much analysis; quite 
simply, the Bargaining Index shows a larger beta weight than the Primordial Index.  Therefore, 
these values demonstrate that 
bargaining theory is more 
strongly correlated with 
aggressive behavior—even 
when controlling for 
ethnicity’s influence. In 
addition, these results are 
significantly correlated with 
the dependent variable and, 
therefore, allow for a high 
level of confidence.   
 
 
 
 
 
R .709
R Square .503
Significance .002
Linear Regression Model Summary
Beta Weights Sig.
Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index 0.517** .006
Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index 0.478** .010
**-- Significance at the .001 level
Linear Regression Results
Table 1.5 
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Analysis of Phase Two   
 This research’s main hypothesis was that bargaining theory would be more strongly 
associated with regional aggression than would primordial theory.  The hypothesis was most 
succinctly and directly verified through the linear regression analysis, which clearly showed that 
the Aggregate Bargaining Indicator Index did indeed have a stronger correlation with the 
Center/Periphery Aggression Index.  It should be noted, however, that the difference between the 
indices’ beta weights was relatively small; this similar level of influence requires further 
investigation.  Regardless, the findings support the study’s main hypothesis.   
  Two useful conclusions can be made based upon the findings. The first conclusion is that 
in order to accurately predict regional stability in the Russian Federation, actors should assess 
the given region’s “bargaining chips”. The second and more generalizable conclusion is that 
cultural differences are not the strongest determinants of conflict in Russian center/periphery 
relations. In other words, this study disputes Geertz’s assertion that ethnic characteristics “have 
ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” when considering 
federal relations in modern Russia (42). 
 
Reconsidering Ethnicity’s Role  
in Modern Russia 
 Questions for Further Research.  The results of this study suggest that, when considering 
the Russian Federation, there is less direct causality between primordial factors and regional 
aggression than has previously been suggested. This statement was supported by an investigation 
of the 21 autonomous federal regions and their corresponding titular nationalities. In addition, the 
investigation revealed a significantly strong relationship between leverage at the bargaining table 
and aggressive behavior towards the center.  Therefore, this research achieved its goal of showing 
that regional conflict in the Russian Federation is most strongly governed by the rules of 
bargaining theory.  In this sense, it brings greater clarity to the discussion of Russian 
center/periphery conflict.  However, its conclusions also suggest several new questions.   
 Investigating Bargaining Variable Interaction. Future studies should first address the way 
in which bargaining indicators interact in order to determine regional behavior39.  While it is 
important that their influence as a theoretically linked group of characteristics has been verified, 
interaction among the variables almost certainly varies among regions.  A fruitful question for 
                                                 
39
 A cursory investigation of this issue can be found in Appendix F. 
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future study would be how bargaining indicators enhance or negate other regional characteristics. 
 Accounting for Primordialism’s Influence. Vastly more important, however, is the need 
to account for the continued influence of primordial variables.  Indeed, it should be recalled that 
(1) this study found a robust and statistically significant associations between the APII and 
center/periphery conflict and (2) that roughly 50% of the variance in the dependent variable is yet 
to be accounted for.  Therefore, it may be most fruitful to consider ways of synthesizing 
primordialism and bargaining theory.  A previous study40 took the first step in explaining the link 
between primordialism and bargaining theory by hypothesizing that “[ethnic] stratification has no 
direct effect on an ethnic group’s propensity to engage in collective action, but that its influence is 
mediated by the establishment of ethnic organizations or quasi-groups [Emphasis added]” (431). 
According to this hypothesis, it is probable that primordial variables, when mobilized as 
“bargaining chips”, have an extremely large influence on regional behavior.  The suggested 
relationship between primordialism, bargaining, and regional aggression is illustrated in the 
following figure: 
  
 Hechter sums up the potential of such a synthesis by stating that it “offers the prospect of 
arriving at predictive statements, rather than at the post hoc descriptions [of ethnic behavior] for 
which sociologists have had to settle too frequently in the past” (91).  Therefore, future studies 
should investigate the behavior of primordial characteristics in the arena of bargaining theory.  
Researchers should address how regional leaders most frequently mobilize ethnic identity, the 
                                                 
40
 “A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action’”, Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum.  
Primordial Hypotheses 
Bargaining Index 
 
Regional Aggression Index 
 
become 
Comprehensive Effect 
of All Variables 
 
The Suggested Relationship between 
Ethnicity, Political Bargaining, & Center/Periphery conflict 
Primordial Indicators 
Bargaining Hypotheses 
Bargaining Indicators 
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way in which ethnicity makes its presence felt, and the process by which the mobilization of 
culture leads to center/periphery conflict. The verification of these dynamics would render 
bargaining theory a much stronger predictor of center/periphery conflict by allowing theorists to 
acknowledge the influence of culture.   
 Conclusions.  More than a thousand years of Russian history has proven that culture 
remains a force that, when mobilized, is capable of undermining central authority.  Conversely, 
that same history also demonstrates that ethnic characteristics can actually be utilized as a means 
of organization and governance.  Indeed, Russia’s tumultuous past provides countless examples 
of ethnicity’s dichotomous role as both a precursor for peace and a magnet for conflict.  Perhaps, 
if scholars are one day able to fully understand culture and its influence on behavior, regional 
actors will find themselves better able to manage culture and stifle its potentially violent 
manifestations.  Such capabilities would almost certainly lead to a more stable future for the 
Russian Federation and its 88 regions. 
 This research provides ample evidence to suggest that it is time to reexamine ethnicity’s 
role in Russian center/periphery conflict; clearly, a new understanding of ethnic identity is 
necessary in order to place culture into a rational and modern context.  This study merely takes 
the first step in the proposed investigation by demonstrating that, while culture continues to be of 
the utmost importance in the Russian Federation, any theory of ethno-federal conflict that 
emphasizes inexpugnable ethnic characteristics over the rational nature of modern politics is 
misguided and incomplete.  If supported in future research, the proposed synthesis of ethnic 
identity and rational behavior will gain prominence as an accurate model of federal relations in 
modern Russia. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A– Administrative Divisions of the Russian Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Russian-regions.png 
 
 
 
Appendix B– Full List of Cases 
 
1. Adygea 
2. Altai 
3. Bashkortostan 
4. Buryatia 
5. Dagestan 
6. Ingushetia 
7. Kabardino-Balkaria 
8. Kalmykia 
9. Karachay-Cherkessia 
10. Karelia 
11. Komi 
12. Mari El 
13. Mordovia 
14. Sakha (Yakutia) 
15. North Ossetia-Alania 
16. Tatarstan 
17. Tuva 
18. Udmurtia 
19. Khakassia 
20. Chechnya 
21. Chuvashia 
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Appendix C– Explanation of Indicator Manipulations 
 
Index of Constitutional Aggression 
The index was created by assigning 1 point for a region having demanded inclusion in the 
first round of treaty negotiations and 1 additional point for each instance of discrepancy 
between federal and regional law enshrined in the constitution.  
Instances of Protest, War and Rebellion 
This project assigned each region a score between 0 and 3.  A score of 0 signified no 
instances of protest, war, or rebellion; a score of 1 signified at least one instance of 
protest/rebellion; a score of 2 signified at least one instance of war; and a score of 3 
signified instances of both protest/rebellion and war. 
Timing of Region’s Declaration of Sovereignty 
Treisman’s rankings assign each region a number based upon the quickness with which 
they declared their sovereignty.  The rankings, which are on a scale of 0-11, were recoded 
into a 0-5 scale by dividing each score by 2, and rounding up when necessary. 
Economic Interaction  
In order to accurately gauge the trend of these figures, this study averaged the figures for 
January 2000 and December 2005 in each category.  After transferring each of the four 
figures onto a 5-point scale, this research chose to combine all resulting scores in order to 
construct a comprehensive index of economic activity.  The resulting scores were again 
used to construct a 5-point scale, with higher values denoting a higher volume of 
economic interaction. 
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Appendix D– Borrowed Data Sources 
 
Regional Elite Behavior– Dowley, 1998. 
 
Region Score N Region Score N 
Adygea 3.62 8 Karelia 3.56 25 
Altai 3.33 6 Khakassia 3.64 11 
Bashkortostan 4.00 46 Komi 3.44 16 
Buryatia 3.50 15 Mari El 3.86 7  
Chechnya 4.62 62 Mordovia 3.20 15 
Chuvashia 3.62 13 North Ossetia-Alania 3.12 34 
Dagestan 2.84 19 Sakha-Yakutia 3.68 41 
Ingushetia 3.50 30 Tatarstan 4.33 43 
Kabardino-Balkaria 3.05 21 Tuva 3.80 15 
Kalmykia 3.29 17 Udmurtia 3.43 14 
Karachay-Cherkessia 3.00 11    
 
 
 
Timing of Regional Sovereignty– Triesman, 1997. 
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Appendix E— Results of the eta Test  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F— Interaction among Bargaining Variables  
 This study performed a brief, cursory analysis of the interaction between the three 
bargaining indicators.  Three models were created, with each model including one of three 
possible pairings of bargaining indicators.  The study then tested each two-indicator combination 
for correlation with the dependent variable (R2) through the OLS method. In this way, the 
research was able to assess which indicator pairings, if any, exert an exceedingly large influence 
on regional aggression. The results are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, none of the indicator pairings exerts a substantially greater influence on regional 
aggression than any other.  Therefore, a region that possesses oil and a high-level of economic 
interaction will be no more likely to engage in conflict than will a region that possesses oil and a 
large capital-city population.  This basic investigation does not suggest that there is no particular 
combination of “bargaining chips” that exert an exceedingly large influence on regional 
aggression; it merely demonstrates that, among these three variables, there is no substantially 
influential combination.  In order to investigate the issue further, researchers should perform 
similar analyses using larger pools of variables and more theoretically coherent models.
Indicator Pairing R2 Significance 
Oil & Economic Interaction 0.275 .024 
Oil & Capital Population 0.264   .055 
Economic Interaction & Capital Population 0.250 .075 
Eta
Primordial Indicators
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic 
Minority or Majority 0.522*
Titular Nationalities Sharing of the Russian 
Orthodox Faith .323
Titular Nationality's  Historical Autonomous 
Status .288
Bargaining Indicators
Total Population of the Capital City, 2002 .548
Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline .400
Combined Monthly Economic Interaction .641
Eta Values
*-- Significance at the .05 level
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